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1. Cantor’s diagonal argument, Gödel’s proof, and Turing’s Halting problem 
Whatever other beliefs there may remain for considering Cantor’s diagonal argument1 as 
mathematically legitimate, there are three that, prima facie, lend it an illusory legitimacy; 
they need to be explicitly discounted appropriately.  
The first - Cantor’s diagonal argument defines a non-countable Dedekind real number2; 
the second - Gödel uses the argument to define a formally undecidable, but interpretively 
true, proposition; and the third - Turing uses the argument to define an uncomputable 
Dedekind real number. 
2. Cantor’s diagonal argument 
In the first case, we may define any natural number, expressed in binary notation, and 
followed by a period and a non-terminating sequence of the integers 0 and 1, as a 
Cantorian real number.  
Cantor’s diagonal argument, then, considers any, given, 1-1 correspondence: 
(*) n <=> Cn      
where n ranges over the natural numbers, and Cn is a Cantorian real number of the form 
0.an1an2an3...ani..., where ani is either 0 or 1 for any given i. Cantor then defines the 
                                               
1 Cf. [Ru53], p23, Theorem 2.16. 
 
2 Cf. [Ru53], p9, Definition 1.31. 
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Cantorian number 0.b1b2b3...bi..., such that bi is not equal to aii for any i. Clearly, 
0.b1b2b3...bi... does not correspond to any natural number n in the given 1-1 
correspondence (*). Since any given natural number n can obviously be corresponded to 
the Cantorian number where n is expressed in binary notation, and followed by a period 
and a non-terminating series of 0’s, Cantor concludes that the Cantorian real numbers are 
uncountable. 
It is not at all obvious, however, that the following conclusion can be drawn from the 
above argument: Every Cantorian real number necessarily defines a Dedekind cut3 in the 
rational numbers (or its equivalent Cauchy sequence4 of rationals). 
For instance, consider the non-terminating series of the odd natural numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, ... 
We can express this as the non-terminating binary series: 
1, 11, 101, 111, ... , 
and correspond to it the non-terminating sequence of rational numbers: 
0.1, 0.11, 0.101, 0.111, ... . 
Clearly, this last series oscillates; it can be computed by a classical Turing machine; and 
it defines a Cantorian real number if we accept Turing’s implicit postulation5 that every 
“circle-free a-machine” uniquely defines a non-terminating sequence of the integers 0 
and 1. However, equally clearly, it does not yield a Cauchy sequence of rational numbers 
that can be taken to define6 a Dedekind real number7. 
                                               
3 Cf. [Ru53], p3, Definition 1.4. 
 
4 Cf. [Ru53], p39, Definition 3.10. 
 
5 See §4.1(vii) below. 
 
6 Cf. [Ru53], p39, Theorem 3.11. 
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Cantor’s argument should, therefore, be interpreted only as establishing that we cannot 
define a number-theoretic function f(n) = Cn in such a way that the range of f(n) contains 
all, and only, the Cantorian real numbers.  
However, there may yet be some definable number-theoretic function, f(n), such that:  
(a) its range contains all the Dedekind real numbers;  
(b) it is undefined in the class R of Dedekind real numbers for some values in its 
domain; 
(c) it is defined for these values in the extended class of Cantorian real numbers 
(which clearly contains all the Dedekind real numbers).  
The conclusion: We can neither conclude that Cantor’s diagonal argument determines an 
uncountable Dedekind real number, nor conclude from it that the cardinality of the 
Dedekind real numbers necessarily differs from that of the Dedekind (Peano) natural 
numbers8. 
3. Gödel’s proof 
In the second case, Gödel’s use of the diagonal argument, in his seminal 1931 paper on 
formally undecidable propositions [Go31a], is purely illustrative. He uses it in his 
Introduction simply to sketch the main ideas of his Theorem VI heuristically, without 
claiming any rigour. The aim of his paper, as he then remarks, is to show that: 
                                                                                                                                            
7 Cf. [Ru53], p9, Theorem 1.32. 
 
8 We note that the latter result can be proved non-constructively in set theory (see [Ru53], p34, Theorem 
2.40, Corollary). In ([An02], Corollary 1.1), however, we show that such proofs, which appeal to a 
Separation (Comprehension) Axiom (Schema) for introducing mathematical objects, may invite 
inconsistency. 
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“... The method of proof which has just been explained can obviously be applied to 
every formal system which, first, possesses sufficient means of expression when 
interpreted according to its meaning to define the concepts (especially the concept 
‘provable formula’) occurring in the above argument; and, secondly, in which every 
provable formula is true. In the precise execution of the above proof, which now 
follows, we shall have the task (among others) of replacing the second of the 
assumptions just mentioned by a purely formal and much weaker assumption.” 
The question arises: Is it valid to treat Gödel’s heuristic argument as being equivalent to 
his Theorem VI? Such equivalence is, of course, intuitionistically objectionable; even 
classically, set-theoretic arguments9 corresponding to Cantor’s diagonal argument are not 
considered constructive in any sense. That Gödel did not consider the two as equivalent is 
suggested by his remarks at the end of his Theorem VI: 
“One can easily convince oneself that the proof we have just given is constructive (for 
all the existential assertions occurring in the proof rest upon Theorem V which, as it 
is easy to see, is intuitionistically unobjectionable), ...”. 
Thus, Gödel’s conversion of the non-constructive, semantic, argument into a syntactic 
one that he considered constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, is significant; 
although a strong Platonist, Gödel’s remarks indicate that he intended to ensure that his 
argument, in Theorem VI, does not admit possible inconsistencies that could be argued as 
being inherent in the classically accepted non-constructivity of Cantor's diagonal 
argument. 
                                               
9 Cf. [Ru53], p34, Theorem 2.40, Corollary. 
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4.1 Turing real numbers 
In the third case, the real numbers considered by Turing, in his original 1936 paper on 
computable numbers [Tu36], were explicitly defined as the (non-terminating) 
computations of “circle-free a-machines”. Turing wrote: 
(i) The “computable” numbers may be described briefly as the real numbers whose 
expressions as a decimal are calculable by finite means. 
(ii) According to my definition, a number is computable if its decimal can be written 
down by a machine. 
(iii) The computable numbers do not, however, include all definable numbers, and an 
example is given of a definable number which is not computable. 
(iv) If at each stage the motion of a machine ... is completely determined by the 
configuration, we shall call the machine an “automatic machine” (or a-machine). 
(v) If an a-machine prints two kinds of symbols, of which the first kind (called 
figures) consists entirely of 0 and 1 (the others being called symbols of the second 
kind), then the machine will be called a computing machine. If the machine is 
supplied with a blank tape and set in motion, starting from the correct initial m-
configuration, the subsequence of the symbols printed by it which are of the first kind 
will be called the sequence computed by the machine. The real number whose 
expression as a binary decimal is obtained by prefacing this sequence by a decimal 
point is called the number computed by the machine. 
(vi) If a computing machine never writes down more than a finite number of symbols 
of the first kind it will be called circular. Otherwise it is said to be circle-free. 
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(vii) A sequence is said to be computable if it can be computed by a circle-free 
machine. A number is computable if it differs by an integer from the number 
computed by a circle-free machine. 
(viii) We shall avoid confusion by speaking more often of computable sequences than 
of computable numbers. 
(ix) A computable sequence O is determined by a description of a machine which 
computes O. Thus the sequence 001011011101111... is determined by the table on 
p.234, and, in fact, any computable sequence is capable of being described in terms of 
such a table. 
Again, as in the case of Cantorian real numbers, we cannot assume without a formal 
proof that a given Turing real number, defined as above, is also a Dedekind real number. 
4.2 Turing’s Halting argument 
Although Turing appears to argue in his 1936 paper that Cantor’s argument can be taken 
to establish the Platonic existence of an uncomputable Turing real number10, he seems to 
have been ambivalent about using the argument unrestrictedly whilst introducing the 
Halting problem. Perhaps, echoing Gödel’s reservations to some extent, Turing too felt 
the need to express - albeit obliquely - awareness of a non-constructive element in the use 
of Cantor’s diagonal argument to define a (Dedekind) real number. Whatever the reason, 
he offered an alternative argument that was, essentially, based on defining an 
uncomputable number-theoretic function, rather than on non-constructively postulating 
that a period, followed by a non-terminating sequence of the digits 0 and 1, necessarily 
defines a Dedekind real number. 
                                               
10 Strictly speaking, Turing’s Halting argument only implies that, whereas every Turing real number is, 
obviously, a Cantorian real number, some Cantorian real numbers are not Turing real numbers. 
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The ambivalence is reflected below, in Turing’s 1936 description of the Halting problem: 
(x) This new description of the machine may be called the standard description (S.D). 
It is made up entirely from the letters “A”, “C”, “D”, “L”, “R”, “N”, and from “;”. 
If finally we replace “A” by “1”, “C” by “2”, “D” by “3”, “L” by “4”, “R” by “5”, “N” 
by “6”, and “;” by “7” we shall have a description of the machine in the form of an 
arabic numeral.  
(xi) The integer represented by this numeral may be called a description number 
(D.N) of the machine. The D.N determine the S.D and the structure of the machine 
uniquely. The machine whose D.N is n may be described as M(n). 
(xii) To each computable sequence there corresponds at least one description number, 
while to no description number does there correspond more than one computable 
sequence. The computable sequences and numbers arc therefore enumerable. 
(xiii) A number which is a description number of a circle-free machine will be called 
satisfactory number. In §8 it is shown that there can be no general process for 
determining whether a given number is satisfactory or not. 
(xiv) ... we might apply the diagonal process. “If the computable sequences are 
enumerable, let In be the n-th computable sequence, and let Yn(m) be the m-th figure 
in In. Let J  be the sequence with 1 – Yn(n) as its n-th figure. Since J is computable, 
there exists a number K such that 1 – Yn(n) = YK(n) all n. Putting n = K, we have 1 = 
2YK(K), i.e. 1 is even. This is impossible. The computable sequences are therefore 
not enumerable”. 
The fallacy in this argument lies in the assumption that J is computable. It would be 
true if we could enumerate the computable sequences by finite means, but the 
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problem of enumerating computable sequences is equivalent to the problem of 
finding out whether a given number is the D.N of a circle-free machine, and we have 
no general process for doing this in a finite number of steps. In fact, by applying the 
diagonal process argument correctly, we can show that there cannot be any such 
general process.  
The simplest and most direct proof of this is by showing that, if this general process 
exists, then there is a machine which computes J. This proof, although perfectly 
sound, has the disadvantage that it may leave the reader with a feeling that “there 
must be something wrong”. The proof which I shall give has not this disadvantage, 
and gives a certain insight into the significance of the idea “circle-free”. It depends 
not on constructing J, but on constructing J ', whose n-th figure is Yn(n). 
(xv) Let us suppose that there is such a process; that is to say, that we can invent a 
machine D which, when supplied with the S.D of any computing machine M will test 
this S.D and if M is circular will mark the S.D with the symbol “u” and if it is circle-
free will mark it with “s. By combining the machines D and I we could construct a 
machine M to compute the sequence J'. The machine D may require a tape. We may 
suppose that it uses the E-squares beyond all symbols on F- squares, and that when it 
has reached its verdict all the rough work done by D is erased.  
The machine H has its motion divided into sections. In the first N –1 sections, among 
other things, the integers 1, 2, … , N – 1 have been written down and tested by the 
machine D. A certain number, say R(N – 1), of them have been found to be the D.N’s 
of circle-free machines. In the N-th section the machine D tests the number N. If N is 
satisfactory, i.e., if it is the D.N of a circle-free machine, then R(N) = 1 +R(N – 1) and 
the first. R(N) figures of the sequence of which a D.N is N are calculated. The R(N)-th 
figure of this sequence is written down as one of the figures of the sequence  J' 
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computed by H. If N is not satisfactory, then R(N) = R(N – 1) and the machine goes 
on to the (N + 1)-th section of its motion.  
(xvi) From the construction of H we can see that H is circle-free. Each section of the 
motion of H comes to an end after a finite number of steps. For, by our assumption 
about D, the decision as to whether N is satisfactory is reached in a finite number of 
steps. If N is not satisfactory, then the N-th section is finished. If N is satisfactory, this 
means that the machine M(N) whose D.N is N is circle-free, and therefore its R(N)-th 
figure can be calculated in a finite number of steps. When this figure has been 
calculated and written down as the R(N)-th figure of J', the N-th section is finished. 
Hence H is circle-free. 
(xvii) Now let K be the D.N of H. What does H do in the K-th section of its motion? It 
must test whether K is satisfactory, giving a verdict “s” or “u”. Since K is the D.N 
of Hand since H is circle-free, the verdict cannot be “u”. On the other hand the verdict 
cannot be “s”. For if it were, then in the K-th section of its motion H would be bound 
to compute the first R(K – 1)+1 = R(K) figures of the sequence computed by the 
machine with K as its D.N and to write down the R(K)-th as a figure of the sequence 
computed by H. The computation of the first R(K) – 1 figures would be carried out all 
right, but the instructions for calculating the R(K)-th would amount to “calculate the 
first R(K) figures computed by H and write down the R(K)-th”. This R(K)-th figure 
wonld never be found. I.e., H is circular, contrary both to what we have found in the 
last paragraph and to the verdict “s”. Thus both verdicts are impossible and we 
conclude that there can be no machine D. 
(xviii) The expression “there is a general process for determining … ” has been used 
throughout this section as equivalent to “there is a machine which will determine … ” 
This usage can be justified if and only if we can justify our definition of 
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“computable”. For each of these “general process” problems can be expressed as a 
problem concerning a general process for determining whether a given integer n has a 
property G(n) [e.g. G(n) might mean “n is satisfactory” or “ n is the Gödel 
representation of a provable formula”], and this is equivalent to computing 
a number whose n-th figure is 1 if G (n) is true and 0 if it is false. 
(xix) The computable numbers do not include all (in the ordinary sense) definable 
numbers. Let P be a sequence whose n-th figure is 1 or 0 according as n is or is not 
satisfactory. It is an immediate consequence of the theorem of §8 that P is not 
computable. It is (so far as we know at present) possible that any assigned number of 
figures of P can be calculated, but not by a uniform process. When sufficiently many 
figures of P have been calculated, an essentially new method is necessary in order to 
obtain more figures. 
(xx) We cannot define general computable functions of a real variable, since there is 
no general method of describing a real number, but we can define a computable 
function of a computable variable.  
4.3 The Halting problem and CT 
Now, Turing’s alternative argument is, essentially, the following form of the Halting 
problem11: 
Suppose we have a Turing machine WillHalt which, given an input string M+w, will 
halt and accept the string if Turing machine M halts on input w, and will halt and 
reject the string if Turing machine M does not halt on input w. Viewed as a Boolean 
                                               
11 Cf. David Matuszek’s lecture notes at http://www.netaxs.com/people/nerp/automata/halting2.html. 
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function, WillHalt(M, w) (halts and) returns true in the first case, and (halts and) 
returns false in the second.  
Now, without appealing to Cantor’s diagonal argument, we can prove by contradiction 
that Turing machine WillHalt(M, w) cannot exist. However, the proof does not address 
an implicit, and foundationally fundamental, non-constructive issue: what, precisely, do 
we mean by “M does not halt on input w”? If “WillHalt(M, w)” could effectively 
determine somehow that “M does not halt on input w”, then this procedure could be built 
into M, and so M would halt on w (possibly with the perplexing annotation: “Sorry, this 
program is being halted as the program has determined that it does not halt!”). Thus, we 
cannot even define the machine WillHalt(M, w) as a Turing machine without inviting an 
immediate inconsistency!  
Prima facie, the definition appears similar to that of a “Liar” proposition as “The ‘Liar’ 
proposition is a lie”, or that of a “Russell” set as “{x | ‘x’ is a member of the ‘Russell’ set 
if and only ‘x’ is not a member of ‘x’}”!12 
                                               
12 We note that definitions such as those of the “Liar” proposition and of the “Russell” set are striking 
examples of what may be termed as pseudo-propositions of a language; they have no communicable 
content. They highlight the importance of viewing every formal system non-Platonically as a language of 
communication. Reasonably, any concept expressible within a communicable language must, ipso facto, be 
capable of effectively unambiguous interpretation. 
 
Clearly, if the raison d'etre of a language is to be a medium for communicating content that lies outside the 
language, then the self-referential study of the internal structure of a language must also aim at effectively 
unambiguous communication - in this case, of the nature and structure of formal, finite, strings that are 
finitely constructible within the language.  
 
Admitting non-finite, non-constructive elements into the language may compromise it to the point where 
we could permit non-communicable (or, more accurately, non-discernible) entities to be reflected in the 
language in such a way that they can be interpreted ambiguously by various interpretations - and yet give 
the illusion of unambiguous interpretation within each interpretation.  
 
For instance, if we accept the argument that Cantorian real numbers are not necessarily Dedekind real 
numbers, then Cantor's diagonal construction may, indeed, be a notable example of such ambiguous 
interpretation. 
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So, if we accept that WillHalt(M, w) is a well-defined Boolean function, then the 
significant conclusion from the above (and Turing’s) argument is not that WillHalt(M, 
w) is Turing-uncomputable, since we cannot define a Turing machine WillHalt, but that, 
if the function is effectively computable, then the Church-Turing Thesis is false. 
4.4 CT and Turing’s “oracle” 
We note that, in his 1936 paper, Turing did not conclude from his Halting argument that a 
function such as WillHalt(M, w) is not computable; he only concluded that such a 
function cannot be computed by a Logical Computing (Turing) Machine as defined by 
him. However, since he was of the view that effective computability was, indeed, 
equivalent to computability by an LCM, Turing later proposed that a function such as 
WillHalt could, perhaps, be defined as an “oracle” that is not necessarily mechanical.  
As noted by Hodges [Ho00]:  
Turing's 1938 Princeton Ph.D. thesis, work conducted in close cooperation with 
Church, was entitled Systems of logic defined by ordinals, and published as (Turing 
1939). Predominantly the work consisted of highly technical developments within 
mathematical logic. However the driving force lay in the question: what is the 
consequence of supplementing a formal system with uncomputable deductive steps? 
In pursuit of this question, Turing introduced the definition of an “oracle” which can 
supply on demand the answer to the halting problem for every Turing machine. ... 
Turing defined the “oracle” purely mathematically as an uncomputable function, and 
said, “We shall not go any further into the nature of this oracle apart from saying that 
it cannot be a machine.” The essential point of the oracle is that it performs non-
mechanical steps. 
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Clearly, if the Church-Turing Thesis is false, then WillHalt can be a machine; further, if 
WillHalt is effectively computable, then CT is false. We thus consider whether there are 
mechanical computational processes that are not obviously duplicatable by the operations 
of a classical Turing machine. 
Now, we can design a mechanical computer that will recognise a "looping" situation; it 
simply records every instantaneous tape description at the execution of each machine 
instruction, and compares the current instantaneous tape description with the record. We 
could then instruct the machine to assign arbitrary values to those undefined instances of 
WillHalt(M, w) whose occurrences cause the machine to loop as in (xvii) above13.  
Is such a machine a classical Turing machine? Is the resultant predicate well-defined? 
Does the above construction transform a Turing-undecidable predicate into a decidable 
one? It is not obvious whether classical theory can provide unequivocal answers to these 
questions without recourse to CT, which would beg the question. 
Clearly, if we can show, or accept, that the extended WillHalt(M, w) is well-defined14, 
then CT is false. 
5. The influence of Gödel’s reasoning 
We can argue that the Platonist roots of Turing’s “oracle” are dimly visible in the 
classical acceptance of the non-constructivity that is implicit in Gödel’s reasoning. Prima 
facie, most classical interpretations uncritically draw sustenance, and strength, from the 
original reasoning and conclusions expressed by Gödel in his 1931 paper. Thus it would 
                                               
13 We note that, in the K’th section, machine H will input, and attempt to simulate, machine K on input K ad 
infinitum. 
 
14 That WillHalt(M, w) is a well-defined function is classically well-accepted; the classical conclusion that 
the Halting argument constructively establishes the existence of a Turing-uncomputable number-theoretic 
function presumes such well-definedness. 
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not be surprising if classically accepted heuristic, and formal, expositions are founded on 
implicit, non-constructive, Platonist assumptions that could be implicit in Gödel’s formal, 
and informal, reasoning. The non-constructive logical consequences of such arguments 
would also, then, be classically accepted - perhaps reluctantly - simply because their non-
constructive roots are obscurely hidden in such implicit premises. 
For instance, we note that Gödel’s and Rosser's reasoning is classically viewed as being 
definitively formal. The numerous attempts to challenge the reasoning and its conclusions 
over the years (starting with Wittgenstein most notably, and apparently led by Yessenin-
Volpin later) have invariably, and quite effectively, attracted the fatal criticism of being 
heuristic and non-formal by Gödel’s standard of constructiveness. 
However, both Gödel’s and Rosser's arguments appeal to semantic arguments at some 
point in their reasoning15. This could be obscured if, having accepted these results as 
definitively formal, classical expositions of these arguments appeal at some critical points 
to heuristic interpretations and reasoning for ease of exposition. Classical theory may, 
then, be focusing more on the implications of the accepted interpretations of Gödel’s 
reasoning, and less on seeking any possible non-formal components that may be implicit 
either in the reasoning, or in its interpretation16. 
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